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TOWARDS SECURITY, PEACE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
THE STATE OF PLAY IN SAFE 
AND SECURE MANAGEMENT 
OF AMMUNITION
GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING (GICHD)
The GICHD is an expert organisation working to reduce the impact of mines, cluster 
munitions and other explosive hazards, in close partnership with mine action 
organisations and other human security organisations. We support the ultimate 
goals of mine action: saving lives, returning land to productive use and promoting 
development. Based at the Maison de la paix in Geneva, the GICHD employs around 
65 staff members from over 19 different countries. This makes the GICHD a unique 
and international centre of mine action expertise and knowledge. Our work is made 
possible by core contributions, project funding and in-kind support from more than 
30 governments and organisations.
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INTRODUCTION, SCOPE 
AND METHODOLOGY
8 | Introduction, scope and methodology
Unplanned explosions of poorly managed munitions sites often result in a high 
number of people being killed, injured or displaced. Such sites present a global 
risk with more than half of the countries of the world having experienced incidents 
since 1979.1 Following a peak in 2011 with 37 reported incidents, the trend is still 
high with more than one incident a month in 2017.2
The humanitarian impact is most visible in terms of casualties: an average of more 
than 800 casualties per year, over 35 years (from 1979 to 2013).3 Such impact 
tends to be much higher when sites are located in populated areas,4 as illustrated 
by the multiple explosions at the Mpila ammunition depots in a heavily populated 
area of Congo-Brazzaville in 2011, resulting in 300 killed, 2,500 injured and 121,000 
made homeless. Further to the human toll, the socio-economic consequences of 
such explosions can be significant. For the incident in Congo-Brazzaville, they were 
partially estimated at US$ 672 million.5 The costs of repairing the damage tend to 
be far greater than preventive and effective stockpile management procedures.6 
As an example, the Gërdec explosion in Albania in 2008 resulted in estimated 
socio-economic and clean-up costs of US$ 29 million, whereas preventing the 
accident may have required less than US$ 6.6 million.7
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FIGURE 1 UNPLANNED EXPLOSIONS AT MUNITIONS SITES, 1979 – 2017
Source: Small Arms Survey
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In addition to the humanitarian and socio-economic repercussions, poorly 
managed ammunition also fuels insecurity. Diversion of ammunition8 from 
storage sites, and its onward proliferation, has been a catalyst for armed conflicts 
in various regions of the world. In the wake of the uprising in Libya, weapons, 
ammunition and explosives from looted and often-damaged Libyan stockpiles 
have become key enablers of political instability, security volatility and violence. 
They have reinforced the military capability of a number of non-State actors, from 
West Africa to Syria.9 Also, diverted ammunition and explosives are increasingly 
used to build improvised explosive devices (IEDs).10 The latter have become a 
weapon of choice, especially of non-State actors, in many current conflicts, 
including in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq or Syria. The harm caused by IEDs largely 
affects civilians.11
These developments have underlined the relevance of safe and secure 
management of conventional ammunition. In countries failing to identify and 
dispose of surplus or unsafe stockpiles of ammunition, risks of unplanned 
explosions and diversion are particularly elevated.12
Safe and secure ammunition management should not be comprehended as a 
‘siloed’ set of technical activities, but rather as part of broader efforts towards 
peaceful societies and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
for instance, as a means to reduce violence, curb illicit arms flows and increase 
urban safety. It can also derive from and contribute to security sector governance 
such as at the level of institutions, management processes and the security of 
ammunition storage sites (see Figure 2).
In addition, ammunition management is a pathway towards sustaining peace,13 
including as part of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). At 
the same time, measures geared towards preventing diversion and the illicit 
trafficking of ammunition and explosives are usually part of counter-terrorism 
strategies.14 Finally, efforts to safely and securely manage ammunition contribute 
to implementing arms embargoes, and strengthening compliance with arms 
control and disarmament instruments.
While countries bear the primary responsibility for improving their management 
of ammunition, a considerable number of them have been facing challenges to 
do so effectively. In recent years, much effort has been made to address these 
challenges with a particular focus on strengthening national management 
practices. The ammunition issue has been increasingly discussed, gradually 
creating a more conducive environment for countries to more openly engage. 
The scale of requests for support – and the number of stakeholders involved – has 
augmented as a result.15
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The higher profile of unplanned explosions, recognition of diversion risks and 
the increasing use of IEDs have elevated ammunition management as a priority. 
This has also led to recent international normative developments. The adoption 
by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) of the International Ammunition Technical 
Guidelines (IATG) in 2011 was a landmark in this regard. It was followed by 
the establishment of the UN knowledge management platform dedicated to 
conventional ammunition (UN SaferGuard programme) overseeing IATG roll-out.
It is in this context that Switzerland launched the Safe and Secure Management 
of Ammunition (SSMA) initiative and held two international meetings in 2015 and 
2016.16 Similarly, the African Union (AU) adopted its regional Ammunition Safety 
and Security Management initiative in 2017. The same year, the UNGA resolution 
on ‘problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles 
BROADER POLICY LANDSCAPE OF AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT
TREATY IMPLEMENTATION
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in surplus’ established a multilateral platform for discussions on ammunition, with 
a group of governmental experts (GGE) to be established by 2020.
This report will address the current state of play on safe and secure management of 
ammunition by discussing the normative landscape surrounding it, implementation 
at various levels, as well as key principles and challenges. It will also elaborate on 
gaps and issues for further consideration. It rests on substantive desk research, 
complemented by interviews with and/or questionnaire responses from major 
relevant States and organisations.17
12 | Introduction, scope and methodology
NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS 
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NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS18
International frameworks
At the request of the UNGA in 1997, a study assessed how enhanced controls 
on ammunition and explosives can contribute to ‘preventing and reducing the 
excessive and destabilising accumulation and proliferation of SALW [small arms 
and light weapons]’.19 This brought the topic of ammunition prominently onto the 
international agenda for the first time. Today, a wide range of instruments exist 
that deal with ammunition in different ways, often within the context of SALW 
control (see Table 1).
While the scope of the politically binding 2001 UN Programme of Action on Small 
Arms (UN PoA) did not explicitly refer to ammunition, some controversy persists in 
this regard.20 In fact, the outcome document of the 2016 UN PoA Biennial Meeting 
of States includes references to risks (e.g. accidental explosions), investigative 
methods (e.g. ballistics information) or activities (e.g. life-cycle management) that 
are equally relevant to ammunition as to weapons.21 The forthcoming UN PoA 
Third Review Conference is likely to hold a discussion on ammunition.
Other frameworks deal with provisions directly relevant to ammunition. The 
first legally binding international instrument on small arms control, the 2001 UN 
Firearms Protocol, places ammunition firmly in its provisions aimed at combatting 
the illicit manufacturing and trafficking of ammunition. Relevant provisions are also 
contained in the 2003 Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) that encourages States Parties to take 
generic preventive measures to minimise the occurrence of explosive remnants 
of war, including through munitions management.22
A major addition to the ammunition management framework was added by the 
2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The centerpiece of the treaty, i.e. prohibitions and 
an export assessment procedure, apply to ammunition. Appropriate measures 
that could be undertaken to mitigate risks of exported ammunition being used 
to violate international law can include programmes, agreed between exporting 
and importing States, to strengthen stockpile management capacities. Stockpile 
management also features among areas for international cooperation and 
assistance.23
Finally, the UN Security Council provides a further international legal framework 
under which ammunition management may be addressed (see Box 1).
Normative frameworks and processes on ammunition management | 15
Lastly, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development represents the global 
political framework for the many significant interconnected challenges to 
sustainable development of our times. Since 2016, countries have worked towards 
the achievement of the SDGs. The latter represent an important framework 
for ammunition management and its manifold ramifications. While improving 
stockpile management is key to curbing illicit arms flows (SDG 16.4), it also helps 
to prevent unplanned explosions, enabling at-risk countries to better protect 
civilians (SDG 16.1), increase urban safety (SDG 11.7) and create an environment 
that is conducive to sustainable development. The SDGs can also serve as a 
vehicle for strengthening national institutions in charge of stockpile management 
and promoting their effectiveness, accountability and transparency (SDG 16.6; 
SDG 16.a).25 The importance of the SDGs in this context is echoed by the UNGA’s 
call on States to consider ammunition management as an intrinsic part of their 
actions for achieving the SDGs.26
Regional frameworks
Various regions of the world bear witness to a body of frameworks that address 
the topic of ammunition in various forms and degrees of implementation (see 
Table 1). In the Americas, the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit 
Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other 
Related Materials (CIFTA) has set the benchmark since 1998, serving as a model 
for the UN Firearms Protocol. The CARICOM region, suffering from a high level of 
homicides, has adopted a crime and security strategy and declaration on SALW, 
whereby States are committed to combatting the illicit trade of ammunition or 
enhancing ammunition management.27
Through its resolution 2399 (2018), the UN Security Council, acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, calls upon the CAR authorities to ensure the 
collection and/or destruction of surplus, seized, unmarked, or illicitly held 
weapons and ammunition. Furthermore, the authorities are also encouraged 
to increase their capacity to store and manage weapons and ammunition in 
their possession according to international best practices and norms.24
ARMS EMBARGO ON THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)BOX 1
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Framework Date Legal status
Adoption Entry into 
force
Legally 
binding
Non-legally 
binding
International
2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (universal adherence)
2015 •
ATT 2013 2014 •
CCW Protocol V 2003 2006 •
UN PoA (universal adherence) 2001 •
UN Firearms Protocol 2000 2005 •
Regional 
CARICOM Crime and Security 
Strategy
2013 •
Khartoum Declaration 2012 •
CARICOM Declaration on SALW 2011 •
ECCAS Convention  
(Kinshasa Convention)
2010 2017 •
EU Council Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP
2008 2008 •
ECOWAS Convention 2006 2009 •
EU Strategy to combat illicit 
accumulation and trafficking of 
SALW and their Ammunition
2005 •
Nairobi Protocol 2004 2005 •
OSCE Document on Stockpiles 
of Conventional Ammunition
2003 •
SADC Protocol 2001 2004 •
Nadi Framework 2000 •
CIFTA 1997 1998 •
TABLE 1
SELECTED AMMUNITION-RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL/REGIONAL 
FRAMEWORKS (DETAILED IN ANNEX I)
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A particularly high number of frameworks have been developed on the African 
continent, compared to other regions. The Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Protocol, adopted in 2001, was the first African regional 
small arms agreement to become legally binding. It seeks to prevent, combat 
and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of firearms, ammunition and other related 
materials, regulate the import and export of legal small arms, and harmonise 
national legislation. It served as the basis for the 2004 Nairobi Protocol on the 
prevention, control and reduction of SALW in the Great Lakes region and the 
Horn of Africa.28
Another major instrument on the African continent is the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) 2006 Convention on SALW, their ammunition and 
other related materials. ECOWAS member states committed to taking appropriate 
steps to manage and secure government stocks of weapons and munitions, such 
as by identifying surplus and obsolete stocks for disposal.29 Furthermore, in 2010, 
the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) adopted a legally 
binding instrument, most commonly known as the Kinshasa Convention, which 
establishes measures to control the production, trade and use of small arms. 
Finally, in the 2012 non-legally binding Khartoum Declaration, States Parties are 
committed to controlling SALW across the neighbouring countries of Western 
Sudan, including through physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) of 
State-held SALW and ammunition.
In Europe, the 2003 Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition adopted 
by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) represents the 
major political framework applicable to all OSCE participating States to improve 
stockpile management practice, particularly relating to assessing surplus items 
and risk, and facilitating international cooperation and assistance. In the European 
Union (EU), two major frameworks stand out: the EU Council Common Position 
944, adopted in 2008, defining common rules governing the control of exports 
of military technology and equipment, and the 2005 EU Strategy to combat illicit 
accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition, in particular in the 
Sahel region.
In Asia and the Pacific region, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) created the political 
Nadi framework (2000) to address the problem of illicit arms trafficking in the 
region.30 Later in 2003, PIF adopted the Model Weapons Control Bill, which 
includes standards on safe and secure storage.31 While SALW and ammunition 
do not seem to have yet been dealt with in regional instruments in Asia, efforts in 
this regard are currently ongoing (see Box 2).
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This patchwork of international and regional frameworks, some of which differ in 
their definition of ammunition,32 makes their effective implementation challenging. 
The Small Arms Survey examined definitions, synergies and contradictions in 
terms of stockpile management and diversion of SALW and ammunition across 
the UN PoA, the ATT, the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) and several regional 
African instruments. It revealed a considerable overlap in the nature of stockpile 
management measures required or recommended and inconsistency with regards 
to surplus stocks or diversion prevention. More specifically, the ATT primarily deals 
with diversion prevention during international transfers; the other instruments do 
so during the life of a weapon.33 Better understanding on how the instruments link 
to one another is the pre-condition to enhance the effectiveness of and synergies 
across their implementation.
Norms and standards
The development of norms and standards in recent years is proof of the distinctive 
nature of ammunition (see Annex II). One major development culminated in the 
adoption of the IATG under the UN SaferGuard programme in 2011. Using a three-
tiered progressive risk reduction approach,34 these guidelines were developed 
to assist countries in improving safety, security and efficiency in managing 
ammunition throughout its life cycle.35 Based on good practices from around the 
world, they are a solid foundation for developing national regulations and standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) regarding ammunition management.
Efforts have been made to ensure that standards in the realm of arms control 
and disarmament, although distinct in scope, are fully compatible with one 
another. The IATG, for instance, were developed to complement the 2006 UN 
Integrated DDR Standards and the International Small Arms Control Standards 
(ISACS). Complementarities and similarities also exist between the IATG and 
the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The former are of relevance to 
Since 2015, Cambodia has been leading the efforts of the ASEAN, with 
the support of the EU, to develop a legally binding instrument to tackle the 
problems of illicit firearms trafficking. This initiative responds to a recognised 
need that more should be done to address the security challenges in the 
region. A possible instrument in the future may include provisions on SALW 
ammunition, and on stockpile management and security.
BOX 2
EFFORTS BY THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS 
(ASEAN) TO DEVELOP A LEGALLY BINDING INSTRUMENT
Normative frameworks and processes on ammunition management | 19
mine action organisations for the storage, transport, logistics and disposal of 
ammunition and provide guidance on explosive ordnance clearance of ammunition 
storage sites after an explosion. Consequently, once the IATG came into effect, the 
IMAS were reviewed so as to ensure consistency with these new requirements.36
At the regional level, the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse 
for the Control of SALW (SEESAC) has, since the early 2000s, contributed to 
standard-setting in the form of its Regional Micro-Disarmament Standards and 
Guidelines that comprise standards on ammunition stockpile management or 
ammunition storage and safety.37 Regional organisations have also codified 
good practice to help implementation such as the OSCE’s Handbook of Best 
Practices on Conventional Ammunition38, generic SOPs for stockpile management 
and destruction of SALW by the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament 
and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean or guidelines for the 
implementation of the Nairobi Protocol by the Regional Centre on Small Arms 
and Light Weapons. Noteworthy also are the manuals of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) on Safety Principles for the Storage of Military Ammunition 
and Explosives and for Transport of Military Ammunition and Explosives that 
informed the drafting of the IATG.39 With the adoption of the IATG, there is a 
clear reference point for any subsequent updates of these regional standards 
and guidelines.
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POLITICAL PROCESSES
In parallel to the elaboration of international and regional normative frameworks, 
norms and standards, several political processes on ammunition management 
have taken shape within and outside of a UN framework.
The UNGA has dedicated specific attention to ammunition since 1997 when it 
requested a report on the problem of ammunition and explosives (mandated 
notably under the agenda item on small arms).40 In 2004, the Assembly decided 
to include on its agenda a stand-alone item related to conventional ammunition 
stockpiles in surplus, while the open-ended working group to negotiate the ITI 
also recommended that SALW ammunition be addressed in a comprehensive 
manner as part of a separate process.41 Problems arising from the accumulation 
of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus have since been addressed by 
the UNGA periodically.42 In 2008, a GGE considered further steps to enhance 
cooperation on the topic, which recommended the development of the IATG 
and the set-up of a knowledge resource management platform on ammunition 
technical issues (established later as the UN SaferGuard).43
The latest iteration of the biennial resolution adopted by the UNGA in December 
2017 represents the culmination of that ammunition-specific process.44 This 
resolution establishes open and informal consultations ‘with a view to identifying 
urgent issues pertaining to the accumulation of conventional ammunition 
stockpiles in surplus on which progress can be made’ that may build a basis for a 
GGE to be convened for 2020.45
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Beyond this specific UN General Assembly ammunition-dedicated track, other UN 
processes consider the effective management of ammunition, mostly in relation 
to SALW.46 Since the advent of the UN’s process on small arms, ammunition 
has come into play and been considered an integral part of SALW.47 In principle, 
the UN Security Council treats small arms and ammunition in a comprehensive 
manner when addressing country-specific and thematic items on its agenda. 
For example, UN Security Council resolution 2220 (2015) recognises the value 
of effective PSSM of SALW and ammunition as an important means to prevent 
the illicit transfer, destabilising accumulation and misuse of SALW, while also 
emphasising the need for assistance to develop capacities.48 Since 2016, 
ammunition management has also formed part of another UN process pertaining 
to countering the threat posed by IEDs.49
Switzerland launched its SSMA initiative in 2015 outside of a UN context. This 
initiative materialised in particular in the form of an informal open-ended Group 
of Interested States in Geneva to discuss the topic regularly, as well as two 
international meetings in 2015 and 2016. These meetings were a first attempt 
to stimulate discussions among policy-practitioners and technical experts 
aimed at exploring ammunition management implementation challenges and 
identifying responses to address them. The Swiss initiative is appreciated for 
having boosted attention for and generated political momentum around this 
long-time neglected issue. This achievement has contributed to the strong 
mandate for ammunition management-related work called for by the 2017 
UNGA resolution on the topic.
Most recently, the AU adopted its Ammunition Safety and Security Management 
initiative in 2017.50 In doing so, the AU acknowledges that ‘poorly secured and 
managed Government arms and ammunition stockpiles remain a main source of 
armaments for non-state armed groups, terrorist groups and criminals’, and urges 
Member States to implement PSSM best practices.51 The initiative supports the 
practical steps outlined in the AU master roadmap to ‘silence the guns’, while 
seeking to complement assistance in beneficiary countries. As a first concrete 
result of this initiative, Guinea-Bissau was supported in 2017, while other countries 
including Malawi, Zambia, Angola or Mozambique, are considered for 2018 
and beyond.
22
CHALLENGES IN AMMUNITION 
MANAGEMENT EFFORTS
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NATIONAL LEVEL
Immediate prevention measures are essential, not least to demonstrate positive 
dividends and foster confidence in the process. But focus on short-term 
interventions on physical security and ammunition and explosive management, 
or stockpile accounting training has rarely been proven to be sufficient to address 
the issue and ensure that knowledge and practices are sustained.52 The two 
international meetings convened by Switzerland have clearly sharpened the 
understanding among practitioners of step-by-step and consistent approaches 
as well as sustainable solutions. Also, there is growing recognition that unplanned 
explosions and diversion are symptoms of various shortcomings: lack of political 
awareness, lack of staff capacity, skills and adequate infrastructure, or institutional, 
governance and oversight issues.53
Set up in December 2010, the MTT project aims to develop capacity and 
provide training on weapons and ammunition storage site management, 
safety and security in the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, through 
a train-the-trainer approach.
Led by Switzerland and implemented jointly with Austria and Sweden, the 
project has delivered sustainable results principally due to its multi-level and 
holistic approach:
• While the project provides needs-based, tailor-made modular training, 
it also ensures that knowledge and capacity are incrementally 
transferred and institutionalised with increasing national responsibility 
and autonomy;
• The MTT courses address the needs of armed forces personnel 
working on different aspects of weapons and ammunition life-cycle 
management, recognising that MTT training should be specific to local 
dynamics, sensitive to the actual competencies and needs of recipients, 
and based on an in-country assessment;
• The MTT project strives to ensure coherence between training and 
equipment so that both aspects are delivered in accordance with 
international standards;
BOX 3
MOBILE TRAINING TEAM (MTT) PROJECT IN BOSNIA 
AND HERZEGOVINA
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Although achieving effective and sustainable national ammunition management is 
a multi-layered and context-specific endeavour, efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(see Box 3) illustrate some of the following common key ingredients that have 
emerged over the years:
National awareness and ownership
Many countries remain unaware of the risks associated with the consequences of 
inadequate ammunition management practices and consider addressing them only 
in the aftermath of an explosive event. At times, they also refrain from engaging 
openly, in particular in regions characterised by political tensions. Ammunition 
is more often perceived as an asset than a potential liability. Awareness can, 
in certain contexts, be absent due to political, security or simply cultural and 
language factors.
National ownership is a pre-requisite. Commitment at the top level of govern-
ment does, however, not necessarily trickle down to those actually doing the 
job on the ground. On occasion, implementing agencies are asked for support, 
but once in country, cooperation from local storage holders is not guaranteed. 
• Since building stockpile management capacity requires wider 
institutional, structural, and organisational reforms, the project is 
implemented as part of the Ammunition, Weapons and Explosives 
Master Plan. Led by the Ministry of Defence and coordinated by the 
EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Master Plan 
combines a bottom–up approach to stockpile management with 
top–down reform initiatives (involving, for instance, changes to force 
structure, a country’s normative framework and personnel allocation).
The project is innovative in that it aims for strong coordination and coop-
eration among donors commensurate with their national expertise. 
Switzerland, for instance, leads on the physical security, management, 
and transport of weapons and ammunition, Austria provides expertise 
and training at various levels of ammunition management techniques and 
Sweden, supporting Austria in ammunition training, focuses on the creation 
of ammunition guides. Finally, the initial time frame to achieve the project’s 
objectives was three to five years. It will now last until at least 2019. Project 
partners do not consider that sustainable capacity development constitutes 
a short-term endeavour.54
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Likewise, commitment may be found on the ground whilst lacking at the top level, 
requiring that it be nurtured at all levels.55
Effective ammunition management is driven nationally and takes into account 
country-specific situations.56 Engaging with countries on ammunition also 
pre-supposes a high level of trust and confidence. As trust is necessarily built-up 
over time, support to at-risk countries is a long-term endeavour. Conversely, regular 
changes of personnel working for implementing partners and governmental 
institutions can jeopardise that trust and the likelihood of at-risk countries to 
engage actively.
National capacities and structures
The establishment of effective and well-coordinated national structures is a 
concrete signal that ammunition management is nationally owned. Reality on 
the ground, however, is that the ammunition portfolio often remains an ‘orphan’. 
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Should such structures exist, for instance national SALW commissions, they often 
lack sufficient authority and resources. As a result, when planning and conducting 
their projects, external implementing partners tend to deal with various national 
counterparts.57
Functioning structures and staff competencies are two sides of the same coin. 
At-risk countries often lack capacity to recognise and address the issue. In practice, 
the temptation for international stakeholders to seek immediate improvements 
might result in a vicious cycle: a lack of national institutional capacity leading to 
external material assistance and equipment that does, in turn, not address those 
national gaps in the long term. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates how 
to plan the development of skills and competencies from the beginning, in such a 
manner that it leads to national uptake and capacities at all levels.
National plans with desired end-state
National action plans or strategies, developed by national authorities, are deemed 
essential to set needs-based and context-specific national priorities and define an 
end-state for international cooperation and assistance. Similarly, these plans help 
identify synergies across ammunition-related areas as well as obstacles potentially 
undermining sustainability.58
Applying the IATG at the national level
The development of a national normative and technical framework that is based 
on the IATG is essential for sustainable national ownership and implementation, 
taking into consideration the local context, needs and priorities. Certain national 
norms are often already in place, but generally spread over several disciplines 
associated with the management and storage of hazardous materials, and do not, 
at times, reflect latest normative developments, or lack enforcement mechanisms.
UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS
The risks from poorly managed and unsecured ammunition, especially in volatile 
security environments have been addressed in the mandates of UN missions. 
Change, marking a watershed in the role of peacekeeping missions to address 
these risks can, for instance, be attributed to UN Security Council resolution 2100 
in 2013, explicitly calling on the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission 
in Mali (MINUSMA) to assist the transitional authorities, through training and other 
support, in weapons and ammunition management.59 The role of UN missions in 
supporting weapons and ammunition management practices, especially at the 
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national level, has been further reiterated since several peacekeeping and special 
political missions were mandated with ammunition management-relevant tasks 
(see Figure 3).60
Assistance by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) as part of the 
implementation of peacekeeping/special political mission mandates primarily 
supports national capacity development, including the safe and secure 
management of arms and ammunition stockpiles. UNMAS also provides relevant 
technical advice to national authorities to support compliance with sanctions 
regimes, when applicable.
Ammunition storage facilities of peacekeeping forces themselves represent a risk 
in certain circumstances. The Small Arms Survey noted that ‘the loss of arms 
and ammunition in peace operations is neither infrequent nor inconsequential.’62 
Although the UN system for the management and control of the movement 
of contingent-owned equipment provides for a rigorous stockpile security and 
transport control regime, risk perception and stockpile security practices differ 
from one mission to another, including among contingents of the same mission.63
MINUSMA
Mali
MINUSCA
Central African Republic
UNAMID
Darfur
UNSMIL
Libya
MONUSCO
Dem. Rep. of the Congo
UNSOM
Somalia
UNMISS
South Sudan
UNISFA
Abyei
FIGURE 3
MAJOR CURRENT UN PEACEKEEPING AND SPECIAL POLITICAL 
MISSIONS COMPRISING AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT 
ACTIVITIES (DETAILED IN ANNEX III)61
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INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
In the last decade, PSSM has become a highly requested form of intervention to 
curb illicit flows of SALW and ammunition. Significant international cooperation 
and assistance of a technical and financial nature has been provided to at-risk 
countries through a multiplicity of channels and by an array of actors.64
No global assistance mechanism or trust fund dedicated to ammunition 
management currently exists, increasing the risk of duplicity and lack of coop-
eration. In the absence of such, mine action, SALW control, stabilisation or security 
sector reform portfolios have served as funding streams for ammunition work. 
Furthermore, projects have been funded through thematic channels on regional 
security and counter-terrorism or in the context of specific international and 
regional instruments such as the ATT, UN PoA, CCW Protocol V or the ECOWAS 
Convention, which all comprise a mechanism for international cooperation and 
assistance. Some projects are also funded through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund 
for Assistance in Mine Action, UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms 
Regulation and potentially the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund.
Certain regional organisations also provide platforms for at-risk countries to 
request support. As mentioned above, the OSCE Document on Stockpiles of 
Conventional Ammunition entails an assistance mechanism through which 
participating States can seek expert advice as well as financial and material 
assistance for the improvement of their stockpile management. Similarly, through 
its Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/Partnership for Peace Trust Fund, NATO 
supports projects in allied and partner countries in the realm of mine action, SALW 
control and PSSM. It seems, however, that most support is provided bilaterally 
including in the context of military-to-military cooperation.
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As the wider humanitarian, stability and peacebuilding ramifications of ammunition 
management have begun to complement the previously dominant security 
perception, long-standing bilateral and multilateral military-to-military support 
has been complemented by assistance from a civilian ‘community of practice’, 
including donors, the United Nations, international, regional and non-governmental 
organisations and commercial actors from different backgrounds.65
While ammunition management requires specific technical skills and competence, 
expertise from various other sectors, such as mine action and SALW control, can 
be drawn upon extensively.66 The former tends to perform mostly technical and 
operational tasks, while the latter often conveys an understanding of the SALW 
control context and wider policy frameworks.67 The involvement of organisations 
with different expertise and background allows the overall response to be better 
targeted and to achieve greater impact.68 This notwithstanding, this multi-
stakeholder modus operandi brings challenges in ensuring that actors and projects 
complement each other in a coordinated and coherent manner.
GAPS AND ISSUES FOR  
FURTHER CONSIDERATION
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Analysing the interplay between instruments, processes and implementation 
efforts highlights several avenues that deserve further attention:
Ensuring coherence across legal, political and operational responses
The previous chapter underlined the fact that the framework currently addressing 
ammunition consists of a patchwork of instruments. As reflected at the 2017 OSCE 
Ministerial Council, there is scope to bring regional regimes closer to international 
developments to ensure more coherence.69
Furthermore, the various political initiatives, which culminated in the adoption 
of the 2017 UNGA resolution on ammunition stockpiles in surplus, testify to a 
heightened political momentum. However, it requires deliberate efforts to ensure 
that they feed into one another in a truly coordinated and coherent manner. 
The UN General Assembly ‘track’ coordinated by Germany may lead on political 
work at the global level, clarifying further the state of play and current gaps, 
recommending actions and potentially developing further the political framework 
on the topic. It might address to a lesser extent ‘operational’ aspects, including 
building national capacities, fostering research, exchanging good practices on 
workable solutions, awareness-raising on the IATG, and matching needs with 
resources. The latter, coupled with a regional perspective, has thus far been the 
focus of the Swiss initiative and the more recent initiative by the AU.
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Strengthening capacities, institutions and standards
Incomplete understanding of ammunition management by national counterparts 
often hampers the effectiveness and achievability of institutional, legislative 
and operational changes from the outset. A mix of tailored ‘incentives’ must be 
offered more convincingly to increase appreciation of the risks involved when 
managing ammunition ineffectively and to foster awareness of the breadth of 
measures an appropriate response entails. Greater awareness is required on the 
accountability of national authorities for ammunition management. The risks of 
unplanned explosions for civilians, including socio-economic impact, the threat of 
regional insecurity or costs related to the maintenance of obsolete/unserviceable 
stockpiles, are all dimensions that should be called to mind when engaging on this 
topic at a political level, across State institutions (as opposed to only within the 
Ministry of Defence and relevant departments of the armed forces).
Support is most effective when approached as a broader governance issue. 
National institutions should be established, equipped and, crucially, empowered. A 
certain lack of in-country know-how and related guidance regarding resources and 
capacities required for an institution to sustainably manage ammunition appears 
to be a major impediment in this regard. Comprehensive and long-term support, 
linked to organisational structure, as well as ensuring strong capacities and the 
appropriate decision-making power of such entities, must remain a priority, 
which includes the development of skills and knowledge specific to stakeholder 
groups at all levels. Importantly, sensitising and involving oversight bodies such 
as parliaments should be encouraged.
Particular questions as to the set-up of such entities have arisen. Expanding the 
mandate of an existing body, for example a national SALW commission or a mine 
action authority, is an option that might allow ammunition management-related 
tasks to be efficiently integrated into existing structures.70 Yet, these bodies 
must imperatively be equipped with relevant ammunition expertise and enjoy 
institutional backing from all national stakeholders, including the armed forces, in 
order to be recognised and effective.
With a view to planning and guiding national ammunition management in a 
strategic and sustainable manner, national action plans can play a cardinal role 
in ownership and, by focusing on the national policy level, are key to overcoming 
the slim divide between the normative processes (e.g. UN resolutions, guidelines) 
and technical implementation. National action plans should also be understood 
as a tool to prioritise efforts, coordinate and define objectives and ‘exit points’ to 
which international partners can commit over the medium term. As important as 
these plans are, further guidance is deemed useful and capacity development is 
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needed for their establishment in the future. The 2017 UNGA resolution related 
to problems arising from the accumulation of ammunition stockpiles in surplus 
encourages States to develop them.71
Finally, where legislation for ammunition exists, it rarely addresses the whole scope 
of the issue. Familiarity with the IATG must be increased, including through further 
translations, and capacities developed so that sound national regulations are put in 
place. Some efforts are under way in this regard: the UN Office for Disarmament 
Affairs (UNODA) and the GICHD are developing a guide on establishing national 
standards for ammunition management, and a second one to serve as a ‘basic 
guide’ to assist countries in best utilising the IATG in their national contexts.
Structuring international cooperation and assistance
Ammunition management is a relatively new issue in international cooperation 
and assistance with an array of new actors becoming active. It requires further 
consolidation and structuring to bring the different stakeholders together, harvest 
thematic and institutional synergies across sectors, and nurture a common 
understanding of the breadth of measures required and the different concepts 
used. Better structuring of international cooperation and assistance, i.e. matching 
needs with resources, and increasing coordination among donors is ever more 
important. Not only because it could enhance the performance of international 
cooperation, but also because it could set the basis for far clearer and better 
conditions to build trust and confidence with national counterparts.
At the national level, it is undisputed that ammunition management is a State’s 
own responsibility. In practical terms, a lack of national focal points in charge 
of coordination seriously hampers coherent planning and implementation.72 
However, cases such as Niger document that, in certain contexts, even an existing 
national commission was not effectively involved in national planning; support 
was instead coordinated bilaterally between donors and implementing partners.73 
Examples such as Niger and Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrate, on the one hand, 
the continuing need to promote more structured in-country coordination to help 
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overcome the often fragmented responses. On the other hand, they also suggest 
that partnership agreements need to be sought to ensure national financial and 
political commitment for uptake and sustainability of international assistance.
Approaching ammunition management at the regional level has gained much 
attention, mindful that the diversion and illicit proliferation of weapons and 
ammunition is typically a regional challenge accentuated by porous borders. 
Yet, regional approaches are not effective by and of themselves, but require a 
strong regional arrangement. Certain regional organisations have traditionally 
been engaged, while others have done so more recently (see Box 4). The AU, 
for instance, has recognised the value of equipping itself with a roster of PSSM 
experts from the Greater Sahel States to better respond to requests and broker 
local training capacities across the region. Once operational and qualified, such 
regional experts could complement the UN SaferGuard’s Roster of Experts.
Regional organisations can play a major role in channeling assistance and galvanis-
ing national buy-in and capacities, particularly in Africa and Europe. Partnerships in 
Africa, primarily with the AU and ECOWAS, have been strengthened in the course 
of the last few years. CARICOM and Central America have made good progress 
as well. The active involvement of regional bodies on ammunition manage-
ment seems more challenging in Asia and the Middle East; a focus on national 
approaches in selected countries from these regions might be more realistic. 
Work on issues such as national action plans or result-focused monitoring mecha-
nisms are typically areas that could benefit from stronger regional collaboration in 
the future.
From 2010 to 2016, the OAS established and conducted a programme to 
support Central American countries in different areas of SALW control and 
ammuni tion management. Following international standards, the programme 
resulted in the destruction of surplus/obsolete ammunition, accounting of 
stockpiles, refurbishment of facilities and training in Costa Rica, Dominica or 
El Salvador, among others. The programme has testified to the importance 
of long-standing support and the role that a regional organisation can 
play among countries in similar situations, including as a mechanism for 
accountability. Serving as the Technical Secretariat of CIFTA gives the OAS a 
privileged position in this regard.
AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT SUPPORT BY THE ORGANIZATION 
OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS)
BOX 4
36 | Gaps and issues for further consideration
A recurring challenge in international assistance is the development of sufficiently 
detailed and ‘SMART’-ly formulated requests for support so as to make them 
attractive to donors. This is an issue that the Small Arms Survey’s PSSM Priorities 
Matrix attempts to address by offering a structured framework to requesting 
countries to identify and rank priorities, and improve submissions.74
Finally, although coordination sensibly multiplies the impact of individual efforts, 
mechanisms allowing for effective donor coordination have not kept up with the 
speed at which support has grown, leading to inefficiencies and duplications. 
This should be addressed at the international and/or regional level (see Box 5). 
For its part, the Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG) was 
originally conceived as an informal and apolitical platform for coordination of 
assistance on PSSM (among other tasks),75 with a focus on information sharing. 
It does not, however, fully respond to the need for an effective global forum for 
donor coordination. Similarly, NATO’s SALW and mine action information-sharing 
platform has value in listing SALW control, mine action and certain PSSM projects, 
but is limited to those from NATO and Partnership for Peace countries willing to 
share information on this tool.76
In 2015, recognising the challenge of coordination, the AU together with 
the German Federal Foreign Office, decided to set up a formal, structured 
coordination platform in which the AU, donor representatives, relevant 
regional economic commissions, States, the UN and implementing partners 
meet bi-annually to share information about ongoing and future activities 
on SALW control and PSSM in the Greater Sahel region. Technical working 
groups have been active since, aiming to improve joint planning among 
donors to enhance coordination, reduce duplication and ensure a balanced 
distribution of assistance. An online database has also been requested to 
capture SALW control and PSSM activities planned and undertaken in the 
region.77 A roadmap for the implementation of the AU’s initiative ‘Silencing 
the guns’ with a matching donor coordination structure is under development.
BOX 5
AFRICAN UNION-GERMANY COORDINATION PLATFORM  
FOR THE GREATER SAHEL
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Better anchoring of ammunition management in the ‘bigger picture’
Discussions in past years have revealed that ammunition management has 
somewhat remained removed from disarmament, prevention, sustainable 
development or humanitarian action and that these broader frameworks have not 
been used sufficiently to change the still-prevailing perception that ammunition 
management is a technical, independent activity.78 However, ammunition 
management may yet unfold its true dividends, in particular when contributing 
deliberately and coherently to broader peace and security efforts such as the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development. Similarly, since it can reduce the risk of 
proliferation, violence and crises, the UN Secretary-General’s prevention agenda 
should be increasingly considered in this regard. A gap also persists between 
ammunition management and wider urban planning; settlements around existing 
ammunition depots or populations migrating to the vicinity of relocated depots are 
key issues that can undermine the very objective of PSSM measures.
Finally, there is scope to approach ammunition management more consistently in 
the context of normative frameworks. Related conferences such as the upcoming 
Third Review Conference of the UN PoA or the Fourth Meeting of States Parties 
to the ATT, offer opportunities to anchor ammunition management more firmly 
in these discussions.
More results-focused ammunition management
From years of experience, the result is that by failing to understand the inter connec-
tion between the various ingredients for sustainable ammunition management, 
assistance has not reached its full possible impact.79 Symptomatically, the Small 
Arms Survey noted in 2015 that the impact of stockpile management courses on 
capacities and competencies was hard to evaluate.80
Many donors now increasingly consider their political and financial support 
as an ‘investment’ which requires stakeholders to demonstrate their success 
and impact. Doing so (or not) may determine future funding trends.81 To date, 
ammunition management has remained, to a large extent, reliant on assumptions 
on its impact that output-based, currently (and commonly) used measurements 
(e.g. number of munitions destroyed or storage areas refurbished) are unable to 
demonstrate.82 To address this gap, interventions should be better addressed as 
part of a wider framework (see Box 6).
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Similarly, the development of indicators to measure the impact and effectiveness of 
assistance would allow for better capturing of sustainable change in systems and 
approach, for instance regarding national normative frameworks, organisational 
structures and procedures, training and doctrine development, equipment and 
maintenance, personnel management, finances and infrastructure (i.e. the seven 
conditions for comprehensive ammunition management).86
A workshop in 2016 undertaken by the Mines Advisory Group concluded 
that implementation of SDG 16, specifically its target 16.4 to reduce illicit 
arms flows, ‘provides a clear framework to consider the impact of PSSM 
assistance’.83 Measuring progress towards this target can also be directly 
relevant to the implementation of instruments such as the ATT and the UN 
Firearms Protocol.84 Unsurprisingly, the UNGA encourages States to develop 
ammunition management-specific indicators to complement their national 
SDG frameworks.85
BOX 6 MEASURING PSSM ASSISTANCE WITHIN THE SDG FRAMEWORK
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Systematic ammunition management in UN missions
Ammunition management-related activities are enshrined in certain mandates of 
UN peacekeeping and special political missions. Research for this report suggests 
that they can be more systematically anchored in mandates, operationalised 
and geared towards sustainable solutions. This may apply in particular to the 
development of capacities of national stakeholders in PSSM and efforts towards 
more structural and institutional efforts.87 Also, ammunition management could 
warrant stronger focus (as opposed to weapons management). Ultimately, 
further awareness and knowledge need to be raised among troop-contributing 
countries (TCC), possibly, for instance, as part of pre-deployment training 
guidelines. Changing risk perception, harmonising SOPs, regulating inspections, 
storage requirements and inventory of TCC’s own weapons and ammunition, or 
better standardising TCC’s mandates for the disposal of captured items could 
reduce the loss of material, while strengthening the mission’s protection mandate 
(see Box 7).
UNAMID is a case in point to illustrate improved weapon and ammu nition 
management of a peacekeeping mission. UNMAS Darfur has assisted 
UNAMID military and police contingents in upgrading or refurbishing storage 
sites in accordance with the IATG and ISACS. It also helped establish an 
ammunition and weapons working group to review the mission’s relevant 
activities and draft a joint SOP for safe storage and management of weapons 
and ammunition at UNAMID sites. The SOP is currently pending approval.88
IMPROVING WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT OF 
THE AFRICAN UNION-UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN DARFUR (UNAMID)
BOX 7
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In recent years, the issues arising from unsafe and unsecure management of 
ammunition has been better documented and eventually understood as an area of 
humanitarian and security concern. As a consequence, ammunition management 
has been more firmly placed on the international agenda, at political and norma-
tive level, and a ‘community of practice’ has emerged. International support has 
stepped up to strengthen national efforts.
Major bottlenecks persist for sound and sustainable ammunition management. 
International cooperation and assistance is to be coordinated more effectively, 
national capacities promoted and global awareness sustained. Beyond 
its immediate human and national/regional security benefits, ammunition 
management should also be better understood as a contribution to broader 
efforts of prevention, peace, sustainable development and security sector 
governance. Recent initiatives and processes such as the Germany-led 
UN General Assembly track and the Swiss SSMA initiative are important 
contributions in this endeavour.
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ANNEX I: SELECTED AMMUNITION-RELEVANT  
INTERNATIONAL /REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS
FRAMEWORK OVERALL OBJECTIVE AMMUNITION ASPECT
International
2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (2015)
• To end poverty, protect the planet and ensure 
prosperity for all.
• Target 16.1: Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates 
everywhere.
• Target 16.4: By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, 
strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms 
of organized crime.
• Other relevant targets.
Arms Trade Treaty (2013) • To regulate the international trade in 
conventional arms and seek to prevent 
and eradicate illicit trade and diversion of 
conventional arms by establishing international 
standards governing arms transfers.
• Art. 3: Each State Party shall establish and maintain a national control system 
to regulate the export of ammunition/munitions fired, launched or delivered by 
the conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1), and shall apply the provisions 
of Article 6 (Prohibitions) and Article 7 (Export and Export Assessment) prior to 
authorizing the export of such ammunition/munitions.
• Art. 16.1: In implementing this Treaty, each State Party may seek assistance 
including legal or legislative assistance, institutional capacity-building, and 
technical, material or financial assistance. Such assistance may include stockpile 
management, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, 
model legislation, and effective practices for implementation. Each State Party 
in a position to do so shall provide such assistance, upon request.
Protocol V on Explosive 
Remnants of War to the UN 
Convention on Prohibitions 
or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May Be Deemed to Be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects (2003)
• To address post-conflict remedial measures 
of a generic nature in order to minimize the 
occurrence, effects and the risk of explosive 
remnants of war.
• Art. 9: Bearing in mind the different situations and capacities, each High 
Contracting Party is encouraged to take generic preventive measures aimed 
at minimising the occurrence of explosive remnants of war, including, but not 
limited to, those referred to in Part 3 of the Technical Annex.
• Technical Annex, Part 3, Generic Preventive Measures: In order to ensure the 
best possible long-term reliability of explosive ordnance, States are encouraged 
to apply best practice norms and operating procedures with respect to its 
storage, transport, field storage, and handling.
UN Programme of Action to 
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate 
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms 
and Light Weapons in All 
Its Aspects (2001)
• To prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit 
trade in small arms and light weapons in all 
its aspects.
• The lack of definition of SALW in the UN PoA creates uncertainty as to whether 
provisions that are not clearly limited to the weapons themselves, including 
those in stockpile management, also apply to small arms ammunition, parts and 
components. This has led to political controversy, with some States arguing that 
the Programme of Action applies to ammunition and others rejecting this view.
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International (cont.)
UN Protocol against the 
Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, their 
Parts and Components and 
Ammunition (2001)
• To promote, facilitate and strengthen 
cooperation among States Parties in order 
to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit 
manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, 
their parts and components and ammunition.
• Art. 4: This Protocol shall apply, except as otherwise stated herein, to the 
prevention of illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts 
and components and ammunition and to the investigation and prosecution of 
offences established in accordance with article 5 of this Protocol where those 
offences are transnational in nature and involve an organized criminal group.
Regional
CARICOM Crime and Security 
Strategy (2013)
• To improve citizen security by creating 
a safe, just and free Community, while 
simultaneously improving the economic 
viability of the Region.
• Strategy that fully takes ammunition into account.
Khartoum Declaration on 
the Control of Small Arms 
and Light Weapons across 
the Neighboring Countries 
of Western Sudan (2012)
• To strengthen cooperation and coordination 
efforts in order to control the spread, flow, 
misuse and illegal circulation of small arms 
and light weapons.
• Commitment to strengthen national capacities and institutions to develop 
and implement comprehensive SALW control strategies, national action plans and 
interventions, including Physical Stockpile Security Management of State-held 
SALW and ammunition, in accordance with international standards.
CARICOM Declaration 
on Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (2011)
• To implement all necessary actions at the 
national and regional level to fully combat 
the illicit trade in small arms and light 
weapons and their ammunition […].
• Declaration that fully takes ammunition into account.
Central African Convention 
for the Control of Small Arms 
and Light Weapons, their 
Ammunition and All Parts and 
Components That Can Be Used 
for Their Manufacture, Repair 
and Assembly (2010)
• To prevent, combat and eradicate, 
in Central Africa, the illicit trade and 
trafficking in small arms and light weapons, 
their ammunition and all parts and 
components that can be used for their 
manufacture, repair and assembly.
• Convention that fully takes ammunition into account.
European Union Council 
Common Position 2008/944 
of 8 December 2008 defining 
common rules governing control 
of exports of military technology 
and equipment (2008)
• To define common rules governing 
control of exports of military technology 
and equipment.
• Common Position that fully takes ammunition into account  
(as defined by the Common Military List of the European Union).
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Regional (cont.)
Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) 
Convention on Small Arms 
and Light Weapons, Their 
Ammunition and Other Related 
Materials (2006)
• To prevent and combat the excessive and 
destabilising accumulation of small arms and 
light weapons within ECOWAS.
• To continue the efforts for the control of small 
arms and light weapons within ECOWAS […]. 
• Convention that fully takes ammunition into account.
European Union Strategy to combat 
illicit accumulation and trafficking 
of SALW and their ammunition (2005)
• To combat the accumulation of and illicit trade 
in small arms and light weapons and their 
ammunition.
• Strategy that fully takes ammunition into account.
Nairobi Protocol for the 
Prevention, Control and 
Reduction of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons in the Great 
Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa 
and Bordering States (2004)
• To prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit 
manufacturing of, trafficking in, possession 
and use of small arms and light weapons in 
the sub-region.
• To prevent the excessive and destabilising 
accumulation of small arms and light weapons 
in the sub-region.
• To promote and facilitate information 
sharing and cooperation between the 
governments in the sub-region, as well as 
between governments, inter-governmental 
organisations and civil society, in all matters 
relating to the illicit trafficking and proliferation 
of small arms and light weapons […].
• Commitment to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of, 
excessive and destabilising accumulation of, trafficking in, illicit possession 
and use of small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and other related 
materials, owing to the harmful effects of these activities on the security of 
each state and the sub-region and the danger they pose to the well-being 
of the population in the sub-region, their social and economic development 
and their right to live in peace.
Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe 
Document on Stockpiles of 
Conventional Ammunition (2003)
• To provide participating States, upon their 
request, with a procedure that is designed to 
facilitate the assessment of situations created 
by conventional ammunition, explosive 
material and/or detonating devices presenting 
risks on their territory and to establish a 
framework for international assistance 
(technical, personnel and/or financial) to 
address these risks.
• To assist host and assisting/donor States’ 
efforts to deal with stockpile management, 
stockpile security, and risk assessment of 
conventional ammunition, explosive material 
and detonating devices in surplus and/or 
awaiting destruction […].
• Document that fully takes ammunition into account.
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FRAMEWORK OVERALL OBJECTIVE AMMUNITION ASPECT
Regional (cont.)
Protocol on the Control of 
Firearms, Ammunition and other 
related materials in the Southern 
African Development Community 
(SADC) Region (2001)
• To prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit 
manufacturing of firearms, ammunition and 
other related material, and their excessive 
and destabilising accumulation, trafficking, 
possession and use.
• To promote and facilitate cooperation and 
exchange of information and experience in 
the Region to prevent, combat, and eradicate 
the illicit manufacturing of, excessive and 
destabilising use and accumulation of, 
trafficking in, possession and use of firearms, 
ammunition and other related materials.
• To cooperate closely at the regional level 
as well as at international fora to effectively 
prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit 
manufacturing of, excessive and destabilising 
use and accumulation of, trafficking in, 
possession and use of firearms, ammunition 
and other related materials in collaboration 
with international partners.
• Protocol that fully takes ammunition into account.
Nadi Framework (2000) • To require each person who possesses or uses 
a firearm, ammunition, other related materials 
and prohibited weapons under the authority 
of a permit to have a genuine reason for the 
possession/use of the weapon.
• To provide strict requirements that must be 
satisfied in relation to the possession and 
use of firearms, ammunition, other related 
materials and prohibited weapons.
• Framework that fully takes ammunition into account.
Inter-American Convention 
Against the Illicit Manufacturing 
of and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Ammunition, Explosives, 
and Other Related Materials (1997)
• To prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit 
manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, 
ammunition, explosives, and other related 
materials.
• To promote and facilitate cooperation and 
exchange of information and experience 
among States Parties to prevent, combat, 
and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and 
trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives, 
and other related materials.
• Convention that fully takes ammunition into account.
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ANNEX II: SELECTED AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT-RELEVANT  
NORMS, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES
NORM/STANDARD/GUIDELINE RELEVANT FOCUS
International
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 10.50 – Storage, 
transportation and handling of explosives (2013)
• To provide national mine action authorities and demining organisations  
with guidance on the safe storage, transportation and handling of explosives 
and explosive materials both in the operators’ main base and also in the field or 
temporary base.
• Specifications for the storage of explosives and safety distances when storing bulk 
explosives are those provided by the IATG.
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 11.20 – Principles and 
procedures for open burning and open detonation operations (2013)
• To explain the principles and procedures for the conduct of large-scale open 
burning and open detonation destruction of stockpiles of explosive ordnance 
including anti-personnel mines. This IMAS includes recommendations for the layout 
of disposal sites and the contents of SOPs in order to ensure a safe system of work.
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 11.30 – National planning 
guidelines for stockpile destruction (2013)
• To establish principles and provide guidance for the effective national planning and 
management of stockpile destruction operations of explosive ordnance including 
anti-personnel mines.
International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (2011) • To achieve and demonstrate effective levels of safety and security of ammunition 
stockpiles.
• To provide a comprehensive set of guidelines for the safe and secure storage 
of conventional ammunition.
• To assist States to establish national standards and national SOPs by establishing 
a frame of reference, which can be used, or adapted for use, as a national standard.
Regional
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and 
Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) generic 
standard operating procedures for stockpile management and 
destruction of small arms and light weapons (2013) 
• To assist States in their compliance with international agreements and norms, 
while providing them with specific guidance that can be easily adapted to their 
own administrative and operational systems.
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
Handbook of Best Practices on Conventional Ammunition (2008)
• To serve as a guide for national policymaking by the OSCE participating States 
and encourage higher common standards.
• Compilation of the currently available ‘best practice’ guides of techniques and 
procedures for the destruction of conventional ammunition, explosive material and 
detonation devices and the management and control of stockpiles of ammunition.
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NORM/STANDARD/GUIDELINE RELEVANT FOCUS
Regional (cont.)
South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC). Regional Micro-Disarmament 
Standards and Guidelines (RMDS/G) 05.40 – Ammunition and Explosives 
Storage and Safety (2006)
• To provide specifications and guidelines for the safe storage, transportation 
and handling of ammunition and explosives that are either: 1) recovered 
during SALW collection operations; 2) awaiting destruction; or 3) are surplus 
in storage.
South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC). Regional Micro-Disarmament 
Standards and Guidelines (RMDS/G) 05.50 – Ammunition and Explosives 
Stockpile Management (2006)
• To provide specifications and guidelines for the stockpile management of 
ammunition and explosives that are either: 1) recovered during SALW collection 
operations; 2) awaiting destruction; 3) national stockpiles; or 4) are surplus 
in storage.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Manual of NATO Safety 
Principles for the Storage of Military Ammunition and Explosives 
(AASTP-1) (2006)
• To establish safety principles to be used as a guide between host countries and 
NATO forces in the development of mutually agreeable regulations for the layout 
of ammunition storage depots and for the storage of conventional ammunition and 
explosives therein. These principles are intended also to form the basis of national 
regulations as far as possible.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Manual of NATO Safety 
Principles for the Transport of Military Ammunition and Explosives 
(AASTP-2) (2005)
• To establish safety principles and procedures to be used by NATO forces 
in host countries during the transport of conventional military ammunition and 
explosives by all modes of transport.
Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi 
Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and  
Light Weapons (2005)
• To elaborate a framework for the development of policy, review of national 
legislation, general operational guidelines and procedures on all aspects of SALW, 
required for implementation by the Nairobi Protocol.
• The guide covers the SALW stockpile, in legal non-State possession, as well as 
that in State possession during peacetime.
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ANNEX III: MAJOR CURRENT UN PEACEKEEPING  
AND SPECIAL POLITICAL MISSIONS COMPRISING  
AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES
UN MISSION AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT-RELATED ACTIVITIES
AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Deeply concerned by the proliferation of arms, in particular SALW and the use of such 
arms against civilians, the UN Security Council calls for the implementation of the 
arms embargo.95 UNMAS carries out weapon and ammunition safety management 
initiatives with national security actors to help reduce the potential theft of small arms 
and ammunition and mitigate the risk of unplanned explosions at storage facilities. 
The Ordnance Disposal Office also provides technical support to UNAMID Military 
and Formed Police Units to support compliance with International Ammunition 
Technical Guidelines.96
UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) As a component of UNSOM, UNMAS supports the government in weapons and 
ammunition management in line with sanctions obligations under the partial lifting 
of the arms embargo.102
UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) UN Security Council resolution 2386 (2017) affirms that ‘UNISFA may undertake 
weapons confiscation and destruction in the Abyei.’97 UNMAS manages disposal 
of confiscated weapons and ammunition. UNMAS also trains UNISFA troops in the 
use of the equipment, to meet international standards in weapons and ammunition 
destruction.98
UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) UNMAS has been supporting UNMISS since the beginning of 2017 by ensuring the 
high quality required of ammunition and explosive storage facilities of the Troop 
and Police Contributing Contingents (TCC/PCC) throughout the mission. This has 
included site surveys at TCC/PCC storage facilities and, where necessary, supporting 
these TCC/PCC to upgrade the security of their facilities. These tasks derive from the 
UN Security Council’s mandate to UNMISS on the protection of civilians.99
UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission  
in Mali (MINUSMA) 
UN Security Council resolution 2364 (2017) calls on the UN to ‘assist the Malian 
authorities with (…) weapons and ammunition management’,89 prioritising the 
enhancement of national capacities. While 22 weapons and ammunition facilities 
have been constructed or rehabilitated in northern Mali up to 2017, efforts were 
made for the Malian counterparts responsible for the newly rehabilitated storage sites 
to receive tailored induction trainings on weapons and ammunition management. 
Other qualifying training has also been conducted.90
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UN MISSION AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT-RELATED ACTIVITIES
UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization  
Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)
The UN Security Council calls on MINUSCA to ‘actively seize, confiscate and destroy, 
as appropriate, the weapons and ammunitions of armed elements (…), to destroy, as 
appropriate, the weapons and ammunitions of disarmed combatants’ and to collect 
and/or destroy surplus, seized, unmarked, or illicitly held weapons and ammunition.93 
Beyond implementing a weapons and ammunition management framework, UNMAS 
builds stockpile management capacity and supports disposal of unsafe weapons and 
ammunition collected during DDR. UNMAS also facilitates the delivery of technical 
assistance to the National Commission on SALW.94
UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)
UN Security Council resolution 2348 (2017) ‘calls for continued national efforts to 
address the threat posed by the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse 
of small arms and light weapons, including inter alia through ensuring the safe and 
effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of weapons and 
ammunition, with the continued support of MONUSCO (…)’.91 UNMAS establishes 
weapons and ammunition depots, provides training on their management and also 
supports the government in developing a national action plan on SALW aiming to 
reduce the risks related to the proliferation of weapons and ammunition.92
UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) The UN Security Council mandated UNSMIL to provide ‘support for securing 
uncontrolled arms and related materiel and countering their proliferation’, while 
underscoring the importance of fully implementing existing sanctions measures.100 
In this context, UNMAS has recently developed a technical framework for arms and 
ammunition management to help national institutions manage vast stockpiles of 
controlled and uncontrolled arms.101
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